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From politics to prophecy: environmental quiescence and the
‘peak-oil’ movement
Matthew Schneider-Mayerson*
Department of American Studies, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA
Adherents of the ‘peak-oil’ theory believe that resource depletion will cause
an imminent social collapse that will lead to a simpler and more environ-
mentally balanced world. Although American ‘peakists’ are extremely con-
cerned with environmental issues, their awareness of the scale of ecological
crises (such as climate change), gloomy evaluation of the state of American
environmental politics, and vision of a post-apocalyptic future lead them to
retreat from politics. Their beliefs, inaction, and impact on American envir-
onmental politics are explored.
Keywords: peak oil; inaction; American left; resource depletion; environ-
mentalism; fatalism; Transition Towns
Introduction
The causes of American inaction in the face of pressing ecological crises such as
climate change have been the subject of a great deal of theorising. Scholars have
rightly pointed to a number of factors, including conservatives’ denial of science
(Jacques et al. 2008), the rise of neoliberalism (Niessen 2010), and the unique
psychological dimensions of some environmental issues (Nickerson 2003).
Others have looked to the environmental left itself. Following Nordhaus and
Schellenberger’s (2004) essay on ‘The Death of Environmentalism’, scholars
seemed to have reached a funereal consensus on the state of American envir-
onmentalism – in Environmental Politics’ 2008 special issue on
‘Environmentalism in the United States’, for example, every article used the
word ‘failure’ (e.g. Bryner 2008). In explaining this failure, the passivity and
political inaction of the American left has received insufficient attention. Here, I
examine the ideology and political quiescence of a subculture of American
leftists who are deeply concerned about environmental issues but have turned
away from political solutions: the ‘peak-oil’ movement.
For these Americans, alienation from mainstream American politics and the
frustration of environmental initiatives pushed environmental concerns from the
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realm of politics to prophecy. While Environmental Politics and other journals
have devoted increasing attention to the threat of ‘peak oil’ (e.g. Gonzalez 2007,
Bardia 2009, Curtis 2009, Mulligan 2010, 2011), scholars have largely ignored
the subculture of actual peak-oil believers. Here, I break new ground by looking
beyond the disembodied ‘discourse’ of peak oil ‘eco-apocalypticism’ (Szeman
2007, p. 817) to examine flesh-and-blood ‘peakists’ – Americans for whom
beliefs about oil depletion and other ecological crises are so central to their
sense of self that they constitute an ‘ecological identity’ (Thomashow 1995). We
might expect peak-oil adherents to be deeply involved in environmental politics,
but as a result of their political marginalisation and belief in the futility of
political action, most retreat to personal preparations for the expected environ-
mental and societal collapse.
At an historical moment when solutions to ecological crises through electoral
politics seem especially unlikely to many Americans, the prophecy of peak oil
provides one means of imagining a significantly different world. Peakists see
‘peak oil’ – the point in time when the maximum rate of petroleum extraction is
reached – as an imminent, transformative event that will put an end to American
imperialism and capitalism and deliver a superior, more environmentally
balanced post-apocalyptic future. This revolution will not be authored by elected
politicians or social movements, but by the petroleum-dependent ‘American way
of life’ tripping over its ecological limits. I argue that the peak-oil movement
represents a new configuration of American radical environmentalism, and
suggest that certain aspects of this group’s political quiescence reflect a similar
dynamic among the broader environmentally aware U.S. left. Without including
the peak-oil movement and its ideology, our understanding of environmental
politics in the twenty-first century United States remains incomplete.
The peak-oil movement
To most scholars, ‘peak oil’ serves as shorthand for energy depletion, but for a
subculture of Americans in the early twenty-first century, it became an ideology.
Between 2004 and 2011, more than 100,000 Americans came to believe that oil
scarcity would lead to the imminent collapse of industrial society and the demise
of the United States.1 Many changed occupations, purchased land, and even left
their partners as a result of their newfound belief. For adherents, ‘peak oil’ is an
ideology, an entire system of beliefs.2 It refers to a dramatic teleology in which
energy scarcity leads to the collapse of the late-modern capitalist system.
Believers describe their awareness of this impending event in terms strikingly
similar to a religious conversion. Most recall the exact moment they ‘learned
about peak oil’, their emotional reaction, dramatic change in thinking, and
reordering of their personal cosmologies. A retired meteorologist noted that
‘peak oil can consume you. It changed my perspective on everything’. A
South Carolinian in his early fifties confessed that ‘all of life is now seen through
the lens of a lower energy future and that has affected all of my choices’.
Environmental Politics 867
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Another believer said that his ‘future plans are framed by a peak-oil future’.
Many use the metaphor of awakening to describe the change: ‘once I grasped the
gravity of the situation it was like waking from a dream to find the world is not
all as it seems’.3
The potentially wide-reaching implications of oil depletion have been the
subject of dozens of recent scholarly articles in a wide range of fields and
disciplines, from tourism studies (Becken 2008) to epidemiology (Hanlon and
McCartney 2008). However, the peak-oil movement has been overlooked because
of its virtual organisation. While the Internet enables the rapid creation of sub-
cultures, it can also obscure the extent to which these groupings are reflected in
real-world action and psychological or emotional investment (Wilson 2006). Peak-
oil believers generally meet on the Internet, ‘prep’ for the post-oil future alone, and
rarely seek publicity. To access this largely hidden population, my research
combined multiple methodologies: two large-scale online surveys of participants
(N = 1128 and N = 628); analysis of websites and online forums; literary analysis
of peak-oil fiction; ethnographic research conducted at ‘Transition Towns’ and
peak-oil conferences; and interviews with movement leaders.4
American peakists
Although believers can be found around the world – the Association for the
Study of Peak Oil has chapters in 23 countries – the phenomenon is focused in
the United States (70–77%), where believers have proven especially passionate
and dedicated. Here, I am primarily concerned with American adherents, who are
wealthier and better educated than most Americans.5 Peakists are primarily white
(89–91% of survey respondents), male (73–84%), middle-aged (average age of
47), and upper middle-class (average yearly income between $75,000 and
$100,000).
Peakists are deeply pessimistic about the potential of other fossil fuels and
nonrenewable energy sources to replace petroleum, not only as fuel for trans-
portation but to produce plastics, pharmaceuticals, and the vast array of petro-
chemicals. They hold practical objections to each option – coal, nuclear, solar,
wind – that constitute articles of faith (e.g. Heinberg 2003, Kunstler 2005). Even
if an Apollo-calibre project of renewable energy development were to be imple-
mented immediately, they say, it would be too little, too late. As billions of
people in industrialising nations seek and achieve a first-world, high-energy
lifestyle, global demand for a finite resource will only grow; ‘resource wars’
(Klare 2001) over remaining petroleum will preclude any transition to alternative
energy sources. American believers were much more likely to see ‘resource
wars’ and an ‘apocalyptic scenario’ (including a worldwide ‘die-off’ of billions
of people and a global economic collapse) as probable future events than their
Canadian or European counterparts.6
Despite its name, the peak-oil ideology is more accurately described as ‘peak
everything’ (Heinberg 2007), reflecting the limits-to-growth environmental
868 M. Schneider-Mayerson
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paradigm that emerged in the United States in the late 1960s but fell out of
favour in the 1980s. Peakists are concerned with the threat of an ecological
collapse of which petroleum is the central symbol, and most consider peak oil
and climate change to be interconnected ‘twin crises’. A young man from
Nevada observed that oil depletion is not an isolated issue but ‘part of a larger
pattern including climate change, over-population, degradation of our physical
earth (deforestation, denuding of farming landscapes, etc.)’. AVirginia woman in
her late forties agreed, claiming that peak oil is ‘part of larger environmental
crisis. Other resources are peaking or declining as well (fertile topsoil, wild fish,
pollution sinks)’. A New York City man identified the problem even more
broadly: ‘how humans interact with the environment overall’.
The size of a decentralised movement with survivalist tendencies is impos-
sible to definitively determine, but the significant number of Americans who
subscribed to peakism is borne out by the visitors to and members of subculture
websites. In September 2008 alone, James Howard Kunstler’s ‘Clusterfuck
Nation’ had 190,000 unique visitors and 97,000 return visitors from the United
States alone.7 By December 2009, the website ‘Peak Oil News and Message
Boards’ had more than 19,000 American members.8 Research on ‘lurkers’, who
visit membership sites but do not join or post, estimates that members comprise
only 10% of visitors (Nonnecke and Preece 2000), which suggests that almost
200,000 Americans were regularly visiting just one of many peak-oil websites at
that time.
Although peakists stress the need for collective solutions to ecological issues
such as oil depletion and climate change, most prepare for the post-oil future
alone or with their immediate families. My surveys showed that after becoming
‘peak-oil aware’, almost three-quarters began stockpiling food, more than a third
purchased a more energy-efficient car, one out of four moved to a smaller or
more energy-efficient home, and one out of five changed occupation.9 They also
created a rich, sprawling virtual community of websites, blogs, Podcasts,
YouTube channels, poems, cartoons, video games, online forums, and even
peak-oil therapy and couples counselling.10
The ‘Transition Town’ initiative – a franchise model of intentional commu-
nities whose participants attempt to build resilient, sustainable communities in
preparation for peak oil and climate change – is widely hailed as an ideal
response to these threats, and has received a great deal of scholarly attention
(e.g. Bailey et al. 2010, North 2010, Scott-Cato and Hillier 2010, Smith 2011).
However, most scholars have focused on British Transition Towns, and few have
examined its low participation rate in the context of the broader peak-oil com-
munity. Only one out of four respondents to my surveys had participated in any
such collective or political responses, and many of these had attended one
meeting and never returned. Instead, most said that their chief priority was
‘protecting themselves and their family from the immediate consequences of
peak oil’, instead of ‘educating others’ or ‘working with others to try to avert the
worst consequences’.
Environmental Politics 869
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Peak oil and the American left
This individualism is significant because peakists might otherwise be expected to
spearhead the demand for an overhaul of American environmental policy. Most
have made significant life changes as a result of their ecological beliefs, and they
are strong believers in anthropogenic climate change – 81% reported being
‘worried’ about it (Howard 2009, p. 5), compared to 60% of Americans generally
(Newport 2012).11 The peak-oil movement has been characterised by journalists
as the ‘liberal apocalypse’ (Urstadt 2006) for good reason: 56% of American
peakists described themselves as ‘liberal’ or ‘very liberal’, compared to only
21% of all Americans (Saad 2010b). Given the opportunity to choose from a
wider selection of political categories, approximately 8% call themselves ‘anar-
chist’, 11% ‘socialist’, 20% ‘progressive’, 15% ‘liberal’, and only 5% ‘conser-
vative’. Beyond labels, their values put them far to the left of most Americans. A
total of 81% think that gay men and women should be able to legally marry (with
10% having no opinion), for example, and 80% agreed that ‘we don’t give
everyone an equal chance in this country’.12
In surveys and interviews and on the web, many advance a leftist critique of
the United States as an imperialist power and even of capitalism itself. They view
mainstream American platitudes as a mix of misinformation and outright false-
hoods. For them – judging from comments on forums – ‘the American Dream is
just propaganda used to justify selfish materialism’ (‘The American Dream?’)
and ‘the sad reality of the matter is that “the American Dream” is dying. Every
month more American families are slipping out of the middle class and into
poverty’ (‘Peakoil.com 2011a’). One poster scoffed, in a thread on the subject of
‘American exceptionalism’, ‘we have been the best colonialists in the world. We
sucked the world dry taking a full quarter of its resources for ourselves even
though we only made up 5% of the population. And only a smidgen of that 5%
actually got any of it’ (‘Peakoil.com 2011b’). Distrust of the government extends
to U.S. foreign policy, which most peakists consider to be motivated not by noble
intentions but short-sighted ‘energy imperialism’.
The number who connected peak oil to American imperialism in my surveys
was telling. A few representative commenters considered oil depletion to be part
of ‘the impending fall of the U.S. empire’ or the ‘decline of the West in general,
end of American empire’, caused by ‘Western Civilization’s hubristic blindness
and imperialistic self-destructive tendency’, which would lead to ‘the end of the
U.S. imperialism’. Even more (more than 10% of respondents to one survey) cited
the imminent peak-oil collapse as the death knell of capitalism. A New York man
in his fifties noted that ‘capitalism requires constant *growth* [sic] for it to remain
viable as an economic system, but that continuous growth may well no longer be
possible due to peak oil’. A peakist in her early forties commented that ‘capitalism
as we know it has grown on the back of cheap energy, particularly oil’.
It would be an overstatement to paint all peakists as conscious anti-imperi-
alists or anti-capitalists, but the close connection that most draw between
870 M. Schneider-Mayerson
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imperialism, capitalism, and petroleum shows that they view the consequences of
peak oil as America’s proverbial chickens coming home to roost. One article by a
reformed peakist claimed, with mild exaggeration, that ‘loathing for the United
States is a virtual prerequisite for becoming a peak oil acolyte’ (Bendzela 2011),
and the Virginia man who claimed that ‘our American way of life is coming to an
end’ was not particularly disappointed by this prediction. Like many, he seemed
to view the ‘end of the oil age’ as the end of the American empire and capitalism
itself: a crisis, of course, but also an opportunity. Cultural theorist Imre Szeman
noted this possibility when he asked, ‘Is the end of oil a disaster? This depends,
of course, on the perspective one has on the system in danger of collapse:
capitalism’ (Szeman 2007, p. 808).
While beliefs about inevitable futures have often inspired action, as in the
case of Marxism, they can also lead to political quiescence. Instead of becoming
more engaged in radical or environmental politics, American peakists became
less politically active. Although they followed national and environmental news
more closely after becoming ‘peak-oil aware’, they became less likely to vote or
attend marches, rallies, or protests.13 What is most striking about this group of
leftists is their tendency to see even radical politics as unable to solve environ-
mental problems. While energy concerns have led to a number of recent political
campaigns, such as the anti-nuclear movement, peakists have almost totally
ignored electoral politics as an avenue to address these issues. One representative
respondent described himself as ‘cynical and disassociated. Our government is
unresponsive, in denial, and ineffectual’, while a Colorado man claimed that
‘politics is a supreme waste of time’. Like many adherents, Oily Cassandra, a
pseudonymous writer and filmmaker who posted a popular peak-oil YouTube
video in 2007 (with more than 300,000 views), had previously been active in
leftist politics, such as protesting the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. But in 2007,
she reported that there was no place for her concerns in mainstream American
politics.14 Instead of trying to engage in environmental politics around energy
depletion and climate change, she told her viewers that ‘all you can do is slow
down collapse to try and give all of us enough time to figure out how to best
release ourselves from the age of oil to a simpler, more intimate way of life’
(Cassandra).
From politics to prophecy
This resignation is motivated by a sense of political alienation and a bleak
evaluation of contemporary environmental politics. Peakists are even more scep-
tical than average Americans of elected politicians – only 3% said that most
members of Congress deserve re-election, compared to 21% of Americans (Saad
2010a).15 This scepticism is reflective, in many ways, of the ‘sense of alienation’
that a recent CBS poll found ‘had ticked up in recent years… most Americans feel
alienated from their political leaders and dissatisfied or angry with Washington’
(Montopoli). When historian Timothy P. Weber (1979) pointed out that ‘advocates
Environmental Politics 871
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of apocalypticism’ have typically been ‘outsiders, alienated and disinherited from
the privileged and powerful’ who ‘looked for their future redemption from beyond
the clouds precisely because they had no recourse in the present’ (p. x), he was
discussing how marginalised groups embrace extreme religious ideas, but we might
very well apply his insight to our secular subject. A core aspect of American
political culture in the twenty-first century is a general feeling of political ‘aliena-
tion’ – in one 2011 poll, 73% of respondents agreed with the claim that ‘the people
running the country don’t really care what happens to you’ and 66% agreed that
‘what you think doesn’t count very much anymore’ (Corso 2011). In a different
poll, Americans placed more faith in telemarketers than Congress (‘Poll’)! This
sense of alienation has long been reflected in low voter turnout compared to other
industrialised democracies.16
This belief in the futility of politics is especially strong for peak-oil believers,
who recognise the need for radical changes in environmental policy, but their
about-face was also motivated by a relatively sober calculation of the limitations
of contemporary American environmental politics. As the United States under-
went such a sharp turn to the right over the last three decades (Schulman and
Zelizer 2008, Wilentz 2008) that the use of the label ‘liberal’ can be a political
kiss of death and ‘socialist’ is an insult, leftists – progressives, socialists, anar-
chists, anti-capitalists, and others – have been politically marginalised. Even with
the emergence of the Occupy movement in 2011 (and the re-election of a
Democratic president), most leftist political goals remain beyond the pale of
mainstream American political culture. This is especially true of environmental
initiatives. Although they may be overestimating the consequences of petroleum
depletion,17 peakists’ sense of an imminent ecological crisis is certainly justified –
one could point, for example, to the grave threats posed by climate change,
topsoil erosion, ocean acidification, deforestation, and environmental toxifica-
tion. Their evaluation of the state of American environmental politics, while
perhaps overly defeatist, is not out of touch with the candid assessments of many
respected scientists and environmentalists. Indeed, Sarah Amsler (2010) noted,
‘there are two prominent narratives of crisis in contemporary environmental
politics. One is rooted in fears of ecological catastrophe, and the other in a sort
of anthropological pessimism that human beings lack the will or capacity to
prevent it’ (p. 129).
Since fossil fuels are finite, and the United States is unlikely to transition
rapidly away from a petroleum economy, the thinking goes, might oil depletion
not deliver a solution to (or salvation from) climate change and ecological crisis?
If this seems to be merely wishful or magical thinking, we might ask ourselves
which scenario seems more probable: that American politicians, along with
leaders from other populous and high-energy consuming countries, collectively
decide to reduce their energy usage drastically and convince or require oil
companies and petro-states to forego burning every barrel of petroleum, at
great economic loss, or that they are forced to do so only when they finally
run out of cheap oil? While this line of argumentation is many things –
872 M. Schneider-Mayerson
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pessimistic, defeatist, disheartening – it is neither uninformed nor unrealistic. In
fact, it bears some similarities to claims made by advocates of climate mitigation
and geoengineering (e.g. Kintisch 2010).
Peak-oil prophecies
Peakists’ passivity can be explained by their sense of political alienation and
belief in the futility of action, but it is also enabled by a popular prophecy of the
post-oil world. Believers spend a great deal of time on speculation and prediction
about the future – the ‘Planning for the Future’ section of one website alone
contains nearly 3000 separate threads, some of which have been viewed more
than 300,000 times.18 As the peak-oil movement grew in popularity in the mid-
2000s – as oil moved to the forefront of American consciousness as a result of
the Iraq war, sharp increases in the price of oil and gasoline, and growing
evidence of anthropogenic climate change – a number of adherents wrote spec-
ulative novels about the post-peak future which have proven particularly influ-
ential within the subculture. In them, intransigent contemporary issues are
resolved by the fallout of a peak-oil crisis. Thus, their romantic vision of an
honest, environmentally balanced future becomes a key aspect of their belief
system and political quiescence. Just as scholars have recognised that the apoc-
alyptic doctrines of some evangelical Christians play a crucial role in American
politics (Weber 2005), leftist ecological fatalism should be of concern to scholars
of environmental politics.
As a window into the transformation of political concerns into prophecy, the
genre of peak-oil fiction is instructive. More than a dozen peak-oil novels have
been published in English. They are written by dedicated believers, marketed as
‘peak-oil novels’ and recognised as such on peak-oil forums (e.g. Kaminski
2008). Although a few scholars have discussed these works (Hitchcock 2010,
Curtis 2012, LeMenager 2012, Manjikian 2012), they have been treated primar-
ily as works of fiction. As novels, they are curiosities; as works of prophecy,
which hundreds of thousands of Americans subscribe to, they take on a greater
significance.
In peak-oil fiction, narrative takes a backseat to ideology. The narrator often
breaks from the narrative to educate (or propagandise) the reader about the
process by which oil depletion and energy scarcity caused the disruption of the
status quo, a scramble for survival, and ultimately the collapse of civilisation.
They are best categorised by where they locate themselves on this fixed timeline.
A few, such as Prelude (Cobb 2010), portray the period just before the expected
oil crash, and document the transformative process of becoming ‘peak-oil
aware’. Novels such as Last Light (Scarrow 2007), Boil Over: The Day the Oil
Ran Out (Booth 2010), and Shut Down: A Story of Economic Collapse and Hope
(Flynn 2011) focus on an ensemble of diverse characters as they respond to the
unexpected collapse of the world around them.
Environmental Politics 873
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Each peakist novel contains at least one character who predicted the peak-oil
crisis and is now in a better position to survive. This prophet serves as a model
for the reader, who can now imagine him/herself as more prepared for these
events, constructing a connection between prophecy and fulfilment that often
results in a desire for collapse. As participants become more identified with the
peak-oil theory – discussing it with friends, family, and co-workers, communicat-
ing with other believers on Internet forums, and immersing themselves in peakist
books and films – many begin to (perhaps unconsciously) long for the peak-oil
collapse to occur. At least one believer noticed this tendency, posting that ‘most
of the ardent followers seem to really hope it will happen, either ’cause they
despise the political/economic status quo or they’ve put so much time and energy
into the issue that they feel the need to be proven right’ (‘How many people here
are rooting for peak oil’). If oil depletion causes the apocalyptic collapse these
Jeremiahs predict, they are prophets and potential saviours; if it does not, they are
merely paranoid cranks.
James Howard Kunstler’s (2008) novel World Made By Hand, which was
read by 78% of respondents to one survey, provides the clearest illustration of the
post-apocalyptic redemption of peakism. Readers found the book to be not only
‘seriously addictive’ but prophetic – many used the words ‘real’ or ‘realistic’ to
describe the novel. A peakist from Pennsylvania, for example, said, ‘I think that
World Made by Hand gives quite a probable glimpse of what the post-peak-oil
world could be like later this century’. The novel is set in the mid-2020s, a
decade and a half after the ‘long emergency’ (Kunstler 2005) caused by peak oil:
gas shortages that led to resource wars, starvation, social collapse, and lethal
epidemics. Its primary location is Union Grove, a small town in Upstate New
York whose quaint downtown is now inhabited by a few score of aging towns-
people who live simple lives without the luxuries of gas and electricity.19 Its
protagonist and narrator is Robert Earle, a middle-aged white liberal male, the
‘former CEO of a technology company’ (p. 220) and peak-oil prophet who now
works as a carpenter. Without petroleum for transportation or electricity for the
Internet, survivors experience the paralysis of geographical isolation. Information
about the U.S. government is conveyed through intermittent radio reports, and
when Earle mentions at the end of the novel that ‘the electricity stayed off,
without even a few more additional spasms’ (p. 316), we are left to assume that
the United States has completely collapsed.
Although most reviewers described World Made By Hand as a dystopia, its
post-peak world is actually superior in many ways. A trip to Albany brings into
relief the benefits of Union Grove, which has not suffered from war, nuclear
attacks, or political corruption. It is a genuine community, founded on mutual aid.
The crash of the oil economy has finally caused the fall of capitalism itself, and
residents employ a primitive barter economy, simple but fair. Alcoholism and drug
addiction are nowhere to be found. The government’s absence has forced most
survivors to embrace a Jeffersonian self-reliance, and they have gained the dignity
of working freely for themselves. By necessity, they have become renaissance
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people, producing not only their own food and housing but their own entertain-
ment, alcohol, and drugs. The survivors, as one character puts it, ‘eat real food
instead of processed crap full of chemicals. We’re not jacked up on coffee and
television and sexy advertising all the time. No more anxiety about credit card
bills’ (p. 38). To emphasise that post-apocalyptic cuisine is actually superior to our
own – no fast food, no chemicals, no trans-fatty acids – the narrator lingers on
every culinary description. As one reviewer put it, ‘you can practically taste the
corn bread and the fish that choke this world’s now-unpolluted rivers and streams,
another upside to that whole end-of-civilization thing’ (Salam 2008, p. 15).
Kunstler’s agrarian romanticism is mirrored by his readers. In one survey,
one out of three peakists admitted to feeling some ‘excitement’ about the
post-peak future. An independent poll found that 37% were more ‘excited’
than ‘worried’ about the ‘post-peak years’, and 50% saw the peak-oil collapse
as an ‘opportunity’, not a ‘problem’ (Howard 2009, p. 4).20 Many also
believe that the post-peak world will be more environmentally balanced.
Decades or centuries after the factories, oil drills, and automobiles have
ceased their energies, the planet will recover and survivors will enjoy its
rebirth. Less is generally said, in peak-oil fiction and online discussions, of
the billions that will perish as a result of ecological crises. In World Made By
Hand, post-apocalyptic survivors enjoy a renewed sensitivity to and connec-
tion with the natural world. One character notes with pride that ‘we follow
the natural cycles’ (p. 37), and Earle sings the praises of the quiet life: ‘I
enjoyed the peacefulness and easy pace of the walk. In a car, I remembered,
you generally noticed only what was in your head or on the radio, while the
landscape seemed dead’ (p. 5). Kunstler deploys the pastoral ideal throughout
the novel in his lyrical descriptions of the natural world. Note, for example,
Earle’s description of one of his lovers gutting a fish:
She reached in and removed its guts and flung the guts out in the current. Then she
ran her thumb down along the spine inside of the rib cavity to get out the congealed
blood there …. Finally, she slipped the fish inside the creel and washed the spine
and blood off her fingers in the current. I clapped my hands in appreciation.
Hearing that, she finally turned around. What a sight she was in a wet cotton
drafts. I kicked off my boots and waded out in the water, scooped her into my arms
and carried her back to the gravel bank. (p. 309)
The collapse of industrial civilisation provides the narrator with the opportunity
to adopt a classically masculine pose.21 A return to a pioneer lifestyle thus
provides a welcome change for the former CEO – and might for you too, it is
implied, if you only read the signs and ‘prep’ for what is to come. In this popular
peakist vision of the future, ecological collapse provides a means of both
environmental and social regeneration.
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Conclusion
Although most Americans report being concerned about the environment, their
support for green initiatives remains tepid. According to a 2011 poll on
Americans’ policy priorities, for example, ‘global warming’ was the second
lowest of the 20 options presented (just behind ‘lobbyists’), while the general
category ‘environment’ was only slightly ahead, at number 16 (‘Pew Research
Center for People & The Press 2011’). In this period of recession, austerity, and
continued denial of science (Oreskes and Conway 2011), a broad-based move-
ment for a proportionate, concerted response to the very real ecological crises
that the Earth faces does not seem likely in the very near future. We might expect
political pressure for serious action to be applied from the minority for whom
environmental concerns are a true priority.
For those who hope that the United States will take a more active role in
addressing these issues, the level of fatalism expressed by peak-oil believers is
troubling. We might expect peak-oil believers, as a group of educated, middle-
class leftists who have based their very identities on the threat of environmental
destruction and resource depletion, to be at the forefront of demands for changes
in environmental policy. Instead, they have become more fatalistic, less politi-
cally active, and more quiescent. They note, with a touch of black humour, that
peak oil will provide a solution to anthropogenic climate change: the United
States will finally be forced to curb emissions when it runs out of inexpensive
oil. In some ways, this is a self-fulfilling prophecy: if the most environmentally
aware and concerned citizens retreat from the public sphere into individual
‘prepping’, or even into collective groups such as Transition Towns, the pressure
for political action will only diminish.
I have attempted to explain the peak-oil movement’s surprising quiescence
with reference to their pessimistic appraisal of American environmental politics.
Most peakists believe that the United States is simply unable to solve the major
problems that the country and planet face, which they identify as peak oil,
climate change, and capitalism’s demand for infinite growth in a finite world.
This belief was summarised by a Nebraska man in his thirties, who believed that
political action on these fronts was futile, since the ‘social, political, and media
systems required to make meaningful headway are dysfunctional. Appropriate
responses require a level of discussion that is beyond the capacities of the present
system’ in the United States.
While we might easily dismiss the impact of the peak-oil movement itself
due to its relatively small numbers, we should inspect the relationship between
this ecological pessimism and American environmental politics more broadly.
We should ask, for example, whether a sense of political alienation and futility
have led other environmentally aware Americans to retreat from politics in a
similar way. Scholars studying climate psychology (e.g. Nickerson 2003,
Whitmarsh and O’Neill 2011) and the role of emotion in environmental com-
munications (e.g. Sangolt and Roald 2012; Roeser 2012) are already engaged in
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these questions, and the example of the American peak-oil movement should be
part of this conversation. Of course, the story of peak-oil believers is not yet
concluded – although the question of oil scarcity receives less media attention
than it did from 2005 to 2008 (Denning 2012) and fewer newcomers are flocking
to peak-oil websites – many believers might still be engaged politically. Whether
the peak-oil movement is ultimately a cautionary tale of defeatism and quies-
cence or a narrative of political transformation remains to be seen.
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Notes
1. This figure emerges from analysis of website membership and posting patterns. See
p. 5 for more information.
2. I define ‘ideology’ as Eric Foner (1970) defined it: as ‘the system of beliefs, values,
fears, prejudices, reflexes and commitments – in sum, the social consciousness – of
a social group, be it a class, a party, or a section’ (p. 4). Peakism is marked by many
of the standard characteristics of recognised ideologies, including internal coher-
ence; intellectual abstractness, specificity, and sophistication; dogmatism; and affec-
tive investment (Shils 1967, pp. 974–978).
3. All unattributed quotations are direct quotations from the author’s two surveys of
peak-oil believers.
4. Both anonymous surveys used snowball sampling (or ‘chain-sampling’), which is
particularly effective for recruiting ‘hidden’ populations. The first survey, conducted
in January 2011, gathered 1128 responses from two links on popular peak-oil
websites. The second, conducted in July 2011, recruited 628 participants. I allowed
any interested party to complete the surveys, and asked respondents to forward the
links to their ‘peak-oil aware’ friends and acquaintances. Specific questions ensured
that respondents belonged to the target population. In response to the question, ‘If
you had to quantify your level of certainty in the fundamental theory of peak oil –
that global oil production will peak in the next decade (if it hasn’t already), and that
this event will have grave and potentially apocalyptic effects on the United States
and around the world – on a scale of 1 to 10, what would it be? 1 is disbelief, 10 is
complete certainty’, 93.8% of respondents to the first survey and 85.6% of respon-
dents to the second survey answered ‘7’ or more. The mean for each question was
8.70 and 8.85 respectively. The potential biases inherent in this methodology – such
as the accuracy of self-reported information and self-selection bias – were counter-
balanced by other research methods. For example, the potential that the population
of peakists who would answer an online survey (or even use a computer) might
answer in systematically different ways than peakists who would not answer an
online survey (or use a computer) was discounted by interviews with believers at
peak-oil conferences and Transition Towns.
5. According to a 2010 census, the average American earned between $45,000 and
$74,999. A total of 80% of respondents had a college degree, and 36% had earned
an advanced degree. In response to questions about psychological and social factors,
respondents seemed remarkably average, although control responses from non-
peakists were not available. Most adherents had little previous experience with
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politics, activism, or extreme beliefs of any kind, and did not report having pre-
viously suffered from mental illness.
6. In response to the question, ‘Which of the following do you see as most likely for
the country you currently reside in? Please rate each on a scale of 0 to 10’, American
respondents rated the option ‘Apocalyptic scenario (i.e. violence, epidemics, die-
off)’ with an average of 6.4, while respondents from Canada and Western Europe
averaged 5.6. The standard deviation was 2.4.
7. Statistics available at StatCounter.com link on http://www.kunstler.com. Accessed
on 1 July 2012.
8. At this time, there were more than 30,000 total members. A March 2009 poll taken
by 446 members showed that approximately 63% of the site’s users were American
(‘Where are peakoil.com visitors from?’). Another Peak Oil News poll showed that
relatively few of the site’s visitors were ‘unique’ visitors. While 15% of the poll’s
1406 respondents had only been ‘visiting peak oil.com for’ one day, 57% had been
visiting the site for at least two years (‘I have been visiting’).
9. In response to the question, ‘As a result of your knowledge of peak oil, have you
done any of the following?’, 72% had ‘prepared food or other supplies for yourself
and your family’, 82% had ‘reduced energy usage at your current home’, 38% had
‘purchased a more fuel-efficient car’, 24% had ‘moved to a smaller or more energy-
efficient home’, and 3% had ‘moved to a Transition Town’.
10. For the sake of brevity, I provide one example of each. Website: The Oil Drum.
Blog: Kunstler 2012. Podcast: The Survival Podcast. YouTube Channel: Jocic.
Poetry: The Peak Oil Poet. Comic: Davila. Forum: Peak Oil News & Message
Boards. Peak-oil therapy: McMahon.
11. Since 1989, Gallup has asked a similar question: ‘How much do you personally
worry about global warming?’ The results have ranged from only 50% (in 1998) to
72% (in 2000); at the time of Howard’s poll (2009), 60% worried ‘a great deal’ or ‘a
fair amount’ (Newport 2012).
12. In a Washington Post–ABC poll taken two months before this survey, 53% of
Americans agreed that same-sex marriage should be legal, with 44% against
(Somashekhar). The polling statement ‘we don’t give everyone an equal chance in
this country’ has been used by researchers to measure sensitivity to (and resentment
of) minority groups. In a 2010 survey, the University of Washington Institute for the
Study of Ethnicity, Race and Sexuality found that only 55% of white Americans
agreed with this statement (Parker).
13. In response to the question, ‘Have you been more or less engaged in the following
activities since learning about peak oil? Please put on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 for
much less engaged, 3 for no change, and 5 for much less engaged’, American
peakists averaged 2.79 for the option ‘attending rallies, marches or protests’.
14. ‘Oily Cassandra’, personal communication, 1 February 2010.
15. Some survey questions mirrored, word for word, national polls conducted regularly
over the last 30 years.
16. Over the last 40 years, voter turnout in the United States has hovered between 36%
and 57%, with non-presidential elections generally in the 30s and 40s. This is far
below other industrialised countries. For ‘lower house’ elections, the U.S. average
for the 18 elections before 2001 was 48% turnout of eligible voters. Compare this
rate of participation over the same period to Germany (86%), Holland (83%), Israel
(80%), France (76%), the United Kingdom (76%), Canada (74%), and Spain (73%).
See Franklin 2001.
17. Since there is a finite amount of petroleum on the planet, peak oil is a geologic fact –
the question is when it will occur and what the consequences will be. Given the
number of variables involved, there is no way to predict accurately the event of the
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global peak. The exact number of ‘proven reserves’ of petroleum is unknown, since
oil-producing countries (such as Saudi Arabia) closely guard this information, and
many governments tend to overestimate oil reserves to avoid creating a panic. Future
technological developments that will allow producers to squeeze more petroleum out
of each field are also impossible to predict, as is the public’s tolerance for the
environmental impact of newer methods of production or ‘unconventional’ sources
(such as tar sands and oil shale).
18. As of 3 March 3 2012, the ‘Planning for the Future’ thread of Peak Oil News
contained 2695 topics. The most popular, ‘Today I made/bought/learnt… (for a post-
oil world)’, contained 1936 posts and had been viewed 305,880 times.
19. Although most electricity is not produced from petroleum, Kunstler predicts that
peak oil will cause a global social collapse, ‘resource wars’, and acts of terrorism,
which will disrupt the flow of electricity (see p. 15).
20. James L. Howard (and PowerSwitch Energy Awareness) conducted an online survey
of nearly 300 peakists in 2009. While this population could be slightly different
from population of the author’s surveys, Howard’s survey’s demographics (on age,
gender, country of origin, and a number of other factors) indicate it is a close match.
21. As in conservative survivalist fantasies, Kunstler’s prophetic novel embraces regres-
sive gender roles in a reimagination of white masculinity. This aspect of the peak-oil
prophecy has been criticised by some female participants as a gendered fantasy of
this largely male group.
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